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Abstract 
Recently, Aoki proposed the concept of substantive institutions which relates outcomes of 
strategic interaction with public representations of equilibrium states of games. I argue that 
the  Aoki  model  can  be  grounded  in  theories  of  distributed  cognition  and  performativity, 
which I put into the context of Searle’s philosophical account of institutions. Substantive in-
stitutions build on regularized causal interactions between internal neuronal mechanisms and 
external facts, which are shared in a population of agents. Following Searle’s proposal to con-
ceive rule following as a neuronally anchored behavioral disposition, I show that his corre-
sponding notion of collective intentionality can be grounded in recent neuroscience theories 
about imitation as the primordial process in human learning. I relate this with Searle’s concept 
of status function and the neuronal theory of metaphors, resulting in a precise definition of 
rule-following as performative action. I present two empirical examples, the institution of 
money and status hierarchies in markets. 
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1  Introduction 
 
During the recent debates over the rise of neuroeconomics as a new foundational field in eco-
nomics, four strands of thought emerged in assessing its position in the established theoretical 
structure:  
•  Leading neuroscientists tend to apply the standard economic model of choice in the neu-
roscience context, aiming at a unified theory of choice, which, however, would be a 
naturalistic version of the standard model, because that is seen as being undergirded by 
neuronal mechanisms (Glimcher 2003, 2009).  
•  Leading behavioral economists working in the field of neuroeconomics argue that the 
new results point towards a revision of the standard model, with far-reaching implica-
tions e.g. for normative economics (Camerer et al. 2005, Camerer 2006).  
•  The third position is to claim that neuroeconomics is totally irrelevant for economics, 
because the standard model of revealed preferences is a purely mathematical description 
of observed choices, and therefore does not need any reference to inner states of indi-
viduals at all (Gul and Pesendorfer 2008).  
•  The fourth position considers this claim, and reaches another conclusion, namely that 
this shows that the standard economic model does not refer to the ontological level of 
individuals at all, but to the systems level, with the standard model as an emergent 
property that is ascribed to ‘individuals’, or any other computational mechanism; in this 
framework, neuroeconomics is valid as a description of the underlying physical mecha-
nisms in the particular context of brains, and may be redescribed by means of the stan-
dard model (Ross 2005, 2007b, 2008). 
In this paper, I wish to present another approach, which starts out from the fourth position. 
This proposal is informed by the recent developments in the cognitive sciences, economic 
sociology and the philosophy of mind. I propose a distributed cognition model as a frame-
work for neuroeconomics and related approaches (compare Wilcox 2008). The distributed 
cognition model is no stranger to economics, as it is a central part in Hayek’s evolutionary 
thinking, which has been cited as a possible framework for integrating the new trends in eco-
nomic research also by Vernon Smith (2003). However, so far the implications have not been 
further explored, presumably because this requires to move far beyond the conceptual fron-
tiers of economics, thus laying open even more points of attack to the protagonists of the third 
strand of thought mentioned above, which strives to maintain the axiomatic closure and inde-
pendence of economics. 
The central idea of a distributed cognition approach to economics is to state that individual 
agency emerges at the interface of two ontological levels, namely the level of neuronal proc-
esses in the brain, embedded into its body, and the level of external physical facts with which 
the brain interacts in a regularized and systematic way. This view differs from existing ap-
proaches in a twofold way. Firstly, the neuroeconomic agenda remains to be a core feature, 
but at the same time it can never be posited as a full explanation of human choice, because the 
supposed causal mechanisms are incomplete, neglecting the systematic role of external phe-Institutions, Distributed Cognition and Agency: Rule-following as Performative Action 
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nomena in human cognition. Secondly, the emergentist view on the standard model as a sys-
tem descriptor is recognized, but at the same time this is given a naturalistic interpretation, 
which implies that causal interactions with neuronal facts continue to be seen as essential, as 
well as the physical complements of the system level phenomena. In a nutshell, this corre-
sponds to Hayek’s (1979) view that human knowledge, which underlies human agency, is 
distributed across bodily features (genetic dispositions, brain structures etc.) and external facts 
(cultural patterns, market signals etc.), and is only to a very limited degree accessible to indi-
vidual conscious thought and decision making (compare Oullier and Basso 2010, Basso et al. 
2010). 
I propose a theoretical notion imported from recent research in economic sociology to analyze 
this  interaction  between  the  neuronal  and  the  external  level,  which  is  performativity 
(Herrmann-Pillath 2010a). As I will argue in detail, performativity is introduced as an aspect 
of human agency which provides the microfoundations for distributed cognition. This concep-
tual role corresponds to the role of the term in linguistics and the philosophy of language, 
from which it is borrowed (for a survey, see Lycan 1999). A performative speech act refers to 
an act which creates a social fact, such as a promise or a declaration. This act is an expression 
of individual agency, but at the same time it depends essentially on the irreducible social na-
ture of language, both in the sense that the meanings of words cannot be arbitrarily changed 
by individual choice, and that the implications of the meanings become binding commitments, 
against the background of the defining rules of the language game. I develop a generalization 
of this concept of performativity and argue that economic behavior is performative to a large 
degree, if not in principle. Agency, in the economic context, is performative in being driven 
by the interaction between processes internal and external to the individual, as defined by the 
physical boundaries of its body. I go beyond standard notions of performativity in offering an 
explicitly  naturalistic  account,  which  follows  corresponding  naturalistic  approaches  in  the 
philosophy of mind (for a survey, see Papineau 2007). 
In doing this, I pull together literature from different fields and even domains of research. The 
concept of performativity has been introduced into economic sociology in the context of the 
more specific question how far economic theory is performative, with financial markets as a 
workhorse (MacKenzie 2006, MacKenzie et al. 2007). Extensions have already been pro-
posed in the literature, mainly in focusing on specific economic phenomena, such as the price, 
which, in this view, is seen as a concrete material fact in communities of economic agents 
acting in physical space and time (Callon 2007, Callon et al. 2007). So, my approach is also 
related with the general trend in economic sociology to reconsider the materiality of the econ-
omy (Pinch and Swedberg 2008). I relate this line of thinking with the general program of 
naturalism in the social sciences in general, which is highly diverse, in turn, so in many re-
spects just offering a rich source of inspiration. Mainly I draw on the work by John Searle 
(1995, 2004, 2005), in particular, in providing the essentials of a naturalistic theory of institu-
tions, and I am aware of the fact that this approach manifests many family resemblances with 
other approaches to a realist ontology in economics, especially with a focus on a generalized 
criterion of causality (Bhaskar 1989), and with regard to assigning a ‘real’ status to institu-
tions (Lawson 1997), which I connect with an externalist concept of distributed cognition. 
My  approach  is  closely  connected  to  most  recent  attempts  at  establishing  a  ‘social  neu-
roeconomics’, which recognizes the centrality of neuroeconomics, which I also do, but argues 
that neuroeconomics remains incomplete if the patterns emerging from interactions between 
neuronally constituted systems are neglected (e.g. Oullier, Kirman and Kelso 2008). This lit-Institutions, Distributed Cognition and Agency: Rule-following as Performative Action 
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erature must be seen in the context of the vast field of the philosophy of mind and the related 
debates over reductionism and supervenience, which is so far neglected in neuroeconomics. 
My approach is especially informed by the debate over externalism, both in philosophy and 
cognitive sciences (for overview, see Wilson 2004 and Schantz 2004).  
As I will show in the next section, there are different ways to build bridges between my ar-
gument and the standard economic model. I draw on two connections, in particular. One is the 
discussion  about  preferences,  and  the  possible  need  to  introduce  group-level  preferences, 
which involve an identification between the individual and a group, with a shift of the locus 
of preferences to the collective level (e.g. Sugden’s 2000 theory of ‘team preferences’). The 
other is game theory, especially as applied on institutions, and in the specific context of epis-
temic game theory (Brandenburger 2007). Game theory in its current form is mentalistic and 
builds on an inferential concept of knowledge processing. In the distributed cognition frame-
work, knowledge is seen as embodied in material structures, which, as we shall see, has im-
portant implications how the identities of players in interactions are conceived. This relates 
directly with the concept of ‘types’ in game theory. Many paradoxes in game theory result 
from the exclusive reliance on inferential knowledge and evoporate in a distributed cognition 
framework in which action is not triggered by inferences from knowledge, but knowledge 
inheres physical structures which cause action. 
The paper starts with the discussion of Aoki’s game theoretic conception of institutions, thus 
connecting my argument with established approaches in economics. I connect his analysis of 
‘public representations’ in games with an externalist approach to the identity of players. In 
section 3 I show how this substantive view on institutions relates with Searle’s theory of insti-
tutions, and I offer a social neuroeconomics explication of his notion of collective intentional-
ity, which takes imitation as a central phenomenon. In section 4, I draw on the neuronal teory 
of metaphor in analyzing Searle’s status function and show that performing institutions relates 
with distributed somatic markers in a population of rule-following agents.  In section 5,  I 
sketch two empirical case studies on money and status orders in competitive markets to show 
how neuronal states and institutions relate causally with each other. Section 6 concludes with 
a reformulation of the Aoki model. 
 
2  Distributed cognition and the theory of institutions 
 
The distributed cognition (also: extended cognition) approach claims that human cognitive 
capacities are externalized in an essential way (Hutchins 1995, Sterelny 2004, Clark 2007; for 
a critical assessment, see Sprevak 2009). The media of externalization are manifold, for ex-
ample, memory techniques, tools and devices leveraging human movements, or other indi-
viduals with whom regularized interactions takes place. On a more fundamental level, we can 
say that human language is a prime medium of externalization, as the meanings of language, 
following Wittgenstein’s (1958) classic argument, are necessarily bound to shared patterns of 
language use in communities of speakers. Thus, using a word relies on knowledge about 
proper use which can only be assessed in the context of uses by others. Institutions, Distributed Cognition and Agency: Rule-following as Performative Action 
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This insight allows to establish a direct connection with certain theoretical conceptions in 
economics. For ease of argument, I pick out one specific example which is already congenial 
to my thinking. This is Aoki’s game theoretic conception of institutions (Aoki 2007, 2010, 
extending on Aoki 2001). Aoki proposes a dynamic framework which is summarized in fig. 1, 
and which he refers to as a ‘theory of substantive institutions’. A substantive institution is 
more than just an emergent equilibrium and coordination of mental states of individuals, but 
attains the status of ‘reality’ in the ontological sense, thus transcending the purely inferential 
approach in standard game theory. The objective of this analysis is to grasp the complexity of 
the interaction between individual decisions and institutions. On the one hand, individual de-
cisions are the drivers of social action, including the emergence of institutions (e.g. in social 
contract theories). On the other hand, institutions are constraints on individual decisions (e.g. 
in North’s 1990 approach). This ambivalence is also reflected in different game-theoretic con-
ceptualizations of institutions, where institutions can be both emergent equilibria in games, 
and the rules of the game. 
 
Figure 1: Aoki’s circular-causality approach to substantive institutions 
 
In order to analyze institutions, Aoki proposes to distinguish between the individual and the 
aggregate level, and the behavioral and the cognitive dimension. Standard game theoretic ap-
proaches to institutions put the strategic choices at the center. Choices generate states of the 
game, which are recursive, if equilibria. The choices themselves are generated by certain be-
liefs, which are summarized in the given set of common knowledge about the structure of the 
game, payoffs etc. So, beliefs incentivize choices, and choices generate states of playing the 
game. Now, Aoki introduces a new theoretical conception which opens up the black box of 
common knowledge. He argues that the states of the play are summarized in certain public Institutions, Distributed Cognition and Agency: Rule-following as Performative Action 
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representations, which are perceived by all players, and which induce their individual beliefs. 
Those summary representations do not reflect full and perfect information about the state of 
the game, but they evolve in a way such that the equilibrium state of the game is reproduced, 
until major disruptions of the implied states of knowledge occur. 
Interestingly, Aoki assigns the public representations to the cognitive dimension of his model. 
This vindicates an interpretation in the more general distributed cognition framework. In other 
words, I claim that Aoki’s model is a distributed cognition model of institutions. The repre-
sentations of the states of the game are not simply individual and inner mental states, but rely 
essentially on external means of representation. These public representations, however, do not 
need to be interpreted in a same way by the different parties involved, and they do not simply 
represent inner mental states, because they are independent triggers of such states. We can 
even say that the individual interpretations are irrelevant in equilibrium, because what only 
counts is whether the implied behavior results into recurrent states of play which are sustain-
able. In other words, a shared and interactive pattern of interactions and public representations 
can co-exist with many different internal mental states or interpretations (this differs funda-
mentally from North’s ‘shared mental models’ approach, see Denzau and North 1994, North 
2005). They become relevant in the moment when equilibria collapse, and new equilibria 
need to be established. This is the time of institutional innovation, in which, however, we 
cannot speak of institutions at all. Once institutions are settled, public representations are back 
in their pivotal role of anchoring the entire structure. 
I propose to relate this view with an argument that has been made recently by Don Ross 
(2005, 2007a,c), building on work by Ken Binmore (1994). Ross argues that all games need 
to be analyzed in a three-level structure. One is the level of the strategic interaction in a par-
ticular setting, which is the bread and butter of game theoretic analysis. The other, founda-
tional, is the level on which certain fundamental agent characteristics are determined, and 
which corresponds to the biological setting, i.e. certain biological features of human behavior, 
cognitive capacities and so forth. This is a ‘game of life’ in turn (cf. Binmore 1994), because 
those features evolve in more generic and long-run patterns of intra-species and inter-species 
interactions. Now, Ross argues that there is a third, intermediate level, on which the identities 
of players are determined. This level is essential in human social interaction because of the 
fact of language. Language is a strong device of cheating, as players can suggest any possible 
information about themselves as they wish, only limited by the inferential capacities of the 
counterparties, which analyze their context and the implications for incentives (which is in 
focus in the ‘cheap talk’ literature). However, at the same time language is the only medium 
in which reflections about the game can take place, and in which many strategies such as an-
nouncing commitments can be formulated and implemented. Therefore, language becomes 
the central medium through which player’s identities are fixed (which would correspond to 
the concept of ‘types’ in epistemic game theory). This is possible because of the historicity of 
language. That means, in real world circumstances, where individuals play recurrent, inter-
connected and embedded games, individual identity emerges from shared narratives about the 
history of interactions. These narratives impose certain constraints on linguistic arbitrariness 
of identities, and ultimately fix identities. 
 Institutions, Distributed Cognition and Agency: Rule-following as Performative Action 
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Figure 2: The externalist approach to identity and agency 
 
 
So, I argue that this notion of identity is an integral part of the summary public representa-
tions in Aoki’s model. Identities emerge as public facts, and constrain the range of possible 
outcomes of games, thus making them sustainable over the longer run. So, the individual 
agent that enters institutionalized interactions with others carries an identity which is external 
in an essential way. On the one hand, there is a set of public indicators of identity, which is 
conventionally called the ‘social identity’ (which relates to Akerlof and Kranton 2000). On 
the other hand, there is the narrative of the individual history, which is also public, with dif-
ferent reach and scope, and which is central also for individual projections of future states 
emerging out of that developmental trajectory (compare the related argument by Davis 2007, 
2008). Identities trigger certain choices, such that, to a certain degree, one could even blank 
the ‘beliefs’ part of the Aoki diagram, because the identities, in the average of a population 
sharing an identity, correlate with action patterns directly, even with diverse beliefs in the 
sense of inner mental states (for example, the identity in a caste system generates certain be-
havioral patterns which stabilize the caste system, even if individual beliefs about the self may 
not fully correspond to that). 
This externalist account of identity reflects recent developments in different fields of social 
science. One strand of thought builds on the empirical research on agency, which shows that 
human individual will is very often and systematically guided by determinants which are not 
accessible to conscious reflection and which connect self-perceived agency with the external 
environment (for a conceptual framework, see Davies 2007). This research mainly builds on 
the neurosciences.  Interestingly, it concurs with an entirely independent strand of thought 
which has been developed in the context of actor-network theory, and which is also invoked Institutions, Distributed Cognition and Agency: Rule-following as Performative Action 
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in  theories  about  performativity  (Latour  1995,  Callon  2008).  This is  to  see  agency  as  an 
‘agencement’ which emerges from networks of interaction, involving both other individuals 
and physical facts, especially artefacts. Both lines of thinking end up in a conception of ‘dis-
tributed agency’, in which individual agency supervenes on patterns of interactions between 
internal facts, which I conceive as neuronal facts, in a naturalistic framework, and external 
facts. These patterns of interaction can be further analyzed, with the concept of ‘imitation’ at 
its core. 
 
3  Rule following and imitation: Towards a social neuroeconomics 
 
My reconstruction of the Aoki model already contains defining features of a distributed cogni-
tion model. In the distributed agency conception, the observed behavior of agents cannot be 
simply seen as an expression of inner mental states, but as flowing out of the internal mecha-
nisms that link public representations and actions. I will now throw a closer look at those 
mechanisms,  aiming  at  a  first  definition  of  performativity.  I  claim  that  the  individuals in 
Aoki’s model conduct performative acts when playing the games they are in. 
In order to achieve that, I need to mobilize further intellectual support by another influential 
scholar, John Searle. John Searle (1995, 2005) has proposed a theory of institutions which 
extends on the following essential ideas. He argues that all institutions are built on linguisti-
cally mediated transfers of meaning (which he calls a ‘status function’), that result into the 
assignment of certain powers to certain individuals. Language is central for two reasons. One 
is that the transfer of meaning operates via language; the other is that language is the medium 
of collective intentionality, for its very social nature, already alluded to above. Collective in-
tentionality emerges from the linguistic process and implies that the intention to follow an 
institution is shared by the relevant group in the sense that the individual intention reflects the 
collective intention. Further, Searle proposes a direct neuronal mechanism for this phenome-
non of following an institution or a rule in general. Rule following is not conceived as a con-
scious or rational act, but is a disposition to act which is rooted in neuronal structures.  
This concept of a neuronally anchored disposition is a central building block for a theory of 
performativity as a complement of Aoki’s theory of institutions. This is because it makes im-
plicit what underlies the notion of ‘inducement’ that links up beliefs and public representa-
tions (see fig. 1). A disposition is a structural possibility to trigger a certain action when meet-
ing certain environmental cues, such that for the fully-fledged action pattern to emerge, nei-
ther in the inner states nor in the external environment a full representation of the reasons for 
actions need to exist. For example, if a basketball player takes a certain action that corre-
sponds with the rules of the game, it is neither necessary to have a full internal description of 
the rules which is explicitly followed by the player, nor to have a full description of those 
rules externally. Rules are embodied in signs that have a certain meaning (such as lines de-
marcating the playing field), and in the actions that are recurrently produced during the game, 
resulting in patterns that are followed by all players; the meaning of signs are these patterns, 
in the Wittgensteinian view. Institutions, Distributed Cognition and Agency: Rule-following as Performative Action 
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The latter point needs to be emphasized. Rule following is a behavioral disposition that is 
shared by almost all members of a population and which is activated by imitation as the fore-
most causal mechanism leading to converging and matching action patterns in a population of 
agents.  This  insight  has  been  especially  emphasized  by  recent  research  in  social  neu-
roeconomics which focuses on the mechanisms through which human actions are coordinated 
between individuals by following actions of others, beginning with the coordination of bodily 
movements and ending in more complex mechanisms of cognitively mediated copying (Oul-
lier et al. 2008, 2009, Oullier and Basso 2010a, b). In this context, recent research in the cog-
nitive sciences has provided strong empirical support for a theory of co-action, which recog-
nizes that the human self-perception of agency is very often systematically misleading and 
hides the actual mechanisms of copying and imitating the behavior of others, mediated by a 
large range of signals and cues (Wegner and Sparrow 2007). This results into the surprising 
empirical observation that the brain triggers action in advance of the consciously perceived 
perception of taking the decision to act. This offers an exact and empirically tracable approach 
to collective intentionality as posited by Searle. Individual intentionality is embedded into 
collective intentionality emerging from co-action.  
This perspective is vindicated by current neuroscience models of imitation which go back on 
much earlier thinking, especially to Vygotsky (Moll and Tomasello 2007). In modern concep-
tions of the ‘social brain’ (Frith 2007), and in current attempts at explaining the specifically 
human capacities for culture, imitation stays at the center of attention. Imitation underlies the 
mechanisms of human social learning in networks of interactions (Bentley and Shennan 2003, 
Richerson and Boyd 2005), which is undergirded by neuronal mechanisms and brain struc-
tures which seem to be specific to humans (Tomasello 2008, Tomasello et al. 2005). This is 
because imitation is in fact a very complex cognitive process, because it involves the recon-
struction and de-contextualization of observed actions and imputed intentions of others. In 
these models, the perceived comparison between observed own actions and others’ actions 
drives the process of internalizing certain behavioral patterns in the sense of building up the 
capacities which underly agency, thus actually reversing the causal flow in the ontogeny of 
agency: Imputed intentionality of others (the Dennettian ‘intentional stance’) is projected back 
on perceiving and conceptualizing Ego’s intentionality and agency. That is, individual learn-
ing of certain patterns exclusively relies on external phenomena, and the inner mechanisms 
are merely enabling structures. Especially, one’s own actions are also perceived external phe-
nomena, which only in the course of ontogeny transform into perceived inner states, espe-
cially intentions (in neurosciences, this is the link between motor output and sensory inputs, 
for a survey, see Fogassi 2011). This process is undergirded by specific neuronal structures, 
especially the so-called mirror neurons and the specifically human capacity of ‘mentalizing’ 
(Frith and Frith 2003, Frith and Singer 2008). The resulting mechanism has been put into one 
canonical model by Hurley (2008) (see fig. 3). 
The essential elements of this model are neuronal structures that enable an organism to ob-
serve Alter’s actions, Ego’s actions and to compare them in an evolving system of categoriza-
tion of sensory inputs. This system is anchored in evolved value functions which assign value 
to observed behavioral outputs. The system has the capacity to internalize actions as a result 
of learning (output inhibition), so that more complex imitation also need not involve direct 
action. Institutions, Distributed Cognition and Agency: Rule-following as Performative Action 
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This model can be reframed as a ‘social’ model in fig. 4. We visualize two individuals, who 
manifest the basic feedback loops of imitation, in which own behavioral output is related with 
behavioral outputs of Alter via comparators. In a distributed cognition frame, the outputs ob-
tain the status of signs. That means, for example, that outputs correlate with stable physical 
patterns in the environment of the agents, such as repetitive actions, or certain symbolic fea-
tures such as ways of dressing, or with the involvement of certain physical items such as tools 
and devices. These physical patterns are activated by the agents’ actions. Their effect is two-
fold. Firstly, the physical patterns activate short-cut feedback loops in which agents continu-
ously monitor their own actions relative to those patterns; secondly, they involve with physi-
cal patterns that are generated by Alter.  
 




 Institutions, Distributed Cognition and Agency: Rule-following as Performative Action 
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 157  13 
 
Figure 4: Distributed cognition and neuronal structure 
 
So, I propose that Searle’s notion of collective intentionally is essentially describing the out-
come of the fundamental process of imitation, in the sense of collective intentionality super-
vening on the ongoing dynamic processes of imitation. Imitation is a centerpiece of the dis-
tributed cognition approach, as it establishes the causal connection between external facts and 
inner states. In this very specific sense, collective intentionality is a model of distributed cog-
nition. That is, the notion does not involve any sort of ‘group mind’ (compare Wilson 2004), 
but refers to a regularized patterns of causal interaction between external facts and internal 
neuronal states. Collective intentionality can be empirically determined in the co-action phe-
nomenon. 
To complete this framework, I propose to further generalize this hypothesis with reference to 
the theory of somatic markers, which I will then invoke in the next section to complete the 
theory of performativity. In the Hurley model, the value functions play a pivotal role, because 
they drive the evolution of patterns. Value functions can be genetically stored, or emerge from 
learning.  The  emergent  patterns  can  be  identified  with  ‘somatic  markers’  in  the  sense  of 
Damasio and collaborators (Damasio 1995, Bechara and Damasio 2005, Reimann and Be-
chara 2010). A somatic marker is a particular state of the neuronal system, possibly also in-
volving circuits which connect brain and body, and which triggers certain behavioral outputs, 
or ‘choices’ in economic parlance, following primary and secondary inputs, with the latter 
emerging from internal neurocognitive processes such as classifications or associations. This 
larger emergent pattern can also be called an ‘emotion’ (sharply different from subjectively 
perceived ‘feeling’). So, we can say that ‘following a rule’ flows out from a disposition which 
is physically embodied in sets of somatic markers, and the resulting actions are triggered and 
accompanied by emotional states. These states operate as a memory for the organism and link 
past and present actions.  Institutions, Distributed Cognition and Agency: Rule-following as Performative Action 
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In spite of being internal organismic (but not ‘mental’) states, they can be shared among indi-
viduals, because the triggers involve external facts, which are public, and which operate as 
signs. The meanings of signs are not mental facts, but are the emerging regularities in actions, 
which are public facts in turn, and which converge through the ongoing process of imitation. 
In this sense, institutions build on shared emotions (compare Pham 2007 on the ecological 
rationality of emotions). 
 
4  Performativity and metaphors 
 
I will now finalize the definition of the concept of performativity. My claim is that rule-
following in terms of convergent action patterns is ‘performing’ an institution. In a nutshell, 
this means so far that individual behavioral regularities (‘habits’) correspond to larger patterns 
of behavior in a population of agents. This has to build on external cues, or signs. I now argue 
that these signs result from the fundamental process of metaphors, which is enabled by the 
nature of the external facts being signs relative to the neurocognitive systems. 
Searle uses the notion of ‘status function’ to refer to this process. In his approach, this means 
to treat a pre-existing fact as something else, depending on context. So, for example, in a cer-
tain society a piece of paper is treated as money, or an individual is treated as a judge. This is 
a transfer of meaning, in the first place, which is reflected in a fundamental shift of action 
patterns that can be observed when watching people either using just a piece of paper or using 
it ‘as money’. In the cognitive sciences, we can approach this transfer of meaning in many 
different ways. I distinguish between purely cognitive approaches and neuroscientific ones. 
The first fit into a generalized connectionist framework (see Strauss and Quinn 1997) and 
conceive of metaphors as one example of the more general phenomenon of conceptual blend-
ing (Fauconnier and Turner 2002, 2008). Conceptual blending happens, if two concepts from 
different domains are put into a relation to each other and projected into a new domain of ap-
plication, thus creating a new meaning. As such, conceptual blending underlies all semantic 
creativity in human language, such as the coining of new words by merging them into new 
words.  
However, I argue that the mechanisms underlying Searle’s notion of rule-following have to be 
more specific. This requires the transition to Lakoff’s (2008) neuronal theory of metaphor. 
Lakoff’s theory is also connectionist, yet not only on the semantic level, but also and primar-
ily on the neuronal level. That means, transfers of meaning directly reflect certain neuronal 
processes, such as mappings, circuits and other forms of projections. We do not need to go 
into the details of this approach here. The central hypothesis, in my reception, is that in a 
metaphor, the conceptual blend is more directly based on a shift in neuronal connectivity in a 
way that somatic markers are connected with different signs, so that a rewiring takes place, 
with the same somatic marker connecting with two different signs involved in behavioral 
regularities. This is what Searle, in his approach, refers to as ‘brute facts’.  Institutions, Distributed Cognition and Agency: Rule-following as Performative Action 
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Take, for example, the emergence of certain social institutions that relate with violence (for a 
general naturalistic reconstruction of early human symbols, see Burkert 1996). The use of 
symbols for physical prowess, application of physical force, and the will to apply it, involves 
a shifting connectivity of somatic markers in the sense that the original connectivity relates 
with the specific experiences of physical violence, and possibly activates related memories, 
whereas after the shift the symbol activates the somatic marker (see Bechara and Damasio 
2005 on the distinction between primary and secondary inducers involving different parts of 
the brain, in particular the amygdala and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, respectively). So, 
the metaphor that is activated in the use of the symbol actually means that the symbol ‘is’ 
what it is seen as being representing. This applies for all kinds of metaphors, as has been elu-
cidated in Lakoff’s original theory, even more abstract ones. For example, treating time as 
movement in space would actually activate neuronal connectivities which are causally en-
meshed with movements, so that, to a certain extent, time ‘is’ movement in space. 
This implies that in a metaphor, there is not simply a conceptual blending in a semantic space, 
but also more strictly a transition into a real equality between the source and the target domain 
in terms of the underlying neuronal responses. This is what actually underlies the Searle no-
tion of a disposition that guides institutionalized behavior, and offers a neuroscience explana-
tion of the link between status function and disposition. 
So, we end up with the following definition of performativity. An action is performative, if it 
involves a conceptual blend across different domains, such that the resulting action is linked 
with particular somatic markers which reflect a sustainable disposition to this action, and such 
that the action correlates with the regular occurrence of external facts, which operate as signs 
triggering the somatic markers. As a result, following an institution does not involve an inten-
tion to follow, in the sense of a mental fact, but results from a closed causal feedback loop 
between signs, inner neuronal states, and actions that are signs in turn. As the signs are shared 
in a population of agents, these patterns reflect collective intentionality supervening on the 
underlying causal patterns.  
 
5  Two case studies of performativity 
 
We have now developed a naturalistic theory of ‘following an institution’, which I define as a 
performative act. In this section, I will analyze two case studies of performativity to give em-
pirical support to my argument. The first is the example of money, the second is the example 
of brands and status. In both cases, it is possible to show how a certain regularity in the eco-
nomic process is anchored in specific neuronal mechanisms, which in turn have consequences 
for the aggregate behavioral patterns connected with certain external facts, here, artefacts, and 
which result into real consequences for the economic process which, within certain ranges of 
variations, stabilizes an established pattern of interaction through time. In the first example, 
this is the recognition of a certain currency as money, in the second, this is the reproduction of 
a status order in competitive markets. In both cases, performative action means to make some-
thing ‘real’ which does not have this property ab ovo. Institutions, Distributed Cognition and Agency: Rule-following as Performative Action 
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5.1  Performing money 
 
Money play a central role in economic theory. The standard conception assigns no intrinsic 
value to money, in the sense of the dictum ‘money is a veil’. This assumption stays in stark 
contradiction  with  the  approach  in  experimental  economics  and  neuroeconomics,  where 
money is commonly used as a simple primary reinforcer (Camerer et al. 2005, Knutson and 
Wimmer 2007, Phelps 2009). Indeed, money triggers the same reward circuits in the brain as 
other primary reinforcers, such as watching beautiful faces or viewing delicious food. In eco-
nomics, there are different responses to this observation. One eschews its relevance, arguing 
that this just reflects the indirect utility of the goods money can buy (Harrison 2008). The 
other is to accept the fact that money proper manifests utility. This latter position attains much 
validity beyond the scope of neuroeconomics. There are many results in psychological re-
search which reveal special features of money, as compared to other goods. Lea and Webley 
(2005) have proposed what they call the ‘tool and the drug theory of money’. They argue that 
in real-world uses of money, both aspects intermingle, and may be dominant dependent on 
context. The tool aspect matches with the standard economic conception. The drug aspect 
comes up when analyzing the empirical research about the role of money as a cognitive drug. 
Lea and Webley define cognitive drugs as signs that trigger certain underlying biological 
functions without actually fulfilling them. For example, gambling can be a cognitive drug, 
which might relate with underlying behavior pattern of hunters pursiuing a goal under com-
plex contingencies. Indeed, the neuroscientific litearure on gambling (Clark 2010) shows that 
the addictive effects of gambling relate with the dopaminergic circuits in the human brain, 
which guide reward expectations and concomitant behavior. Raised dopaminergic activity is a 
source of satisfaction on its own, such that the mere pursuit of a goal, in spite of recurrent 
failures, drives actions. 
Now, in case of money similar observations can be made with relation to the activation of 
dopaminergic circuits. This implies that the pursuit of money can be decoupled from the indi-
rect gains that accrue from using the money. In our current context, we can restate the stan-
dard economic argument in the following way. Money is not just a tool which can be used to 
buy other goods, but it turns into a metaphor for these other goods. This metaphorical status is 
very different from the mere use as a tool, because it is undergirded by the activation of the 
same reward circuits as in case of all other goods. Money does not simple indicate utility, it 
represents it metaphorically à la Lakoff. 
One of the strongest results confirming this view is recent research on money illusion, which 
synthesizes psychological and neuroscience approaches. Money illusion is a fact established 
by numerous psychological experiments (Shafir et al. 1997). Recently, money illusion could 
be shown to relate with distinctive patterns of brain activation (Weber et al. 2009). Test per-
sons are not able to distinguish properly between real and nominal values of money, and they 
show much higher satisfaction with rewards that are higher in nominal value, even if the un-
derlying real value is the same as in rewards with lower nominal value, because of different 
and transparent price levels.  Institutions, Distributed Cognition and Agency: Rule-following as Performative Action 
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This distinction shows up in the differential activation of the reward processing areas in the 
brain. This result clearly demonstrates that money is close to a primary reinforcer. Lea and 
Webley summarize a whole lot of empirical observations that underpin this view. In our cur-
rent context, this implies that money as an institution involves a fundamental shift of neuronal 
response patterns as compared to the physical entity that represents money. The institution of 
money is anchored in somatic markers that can be discerned by means of neuroeconomic 
methods. 
5.2  Performing brands 
 
Many markets manifest the distinctive property of a hierarchical order of status. This is true 
for many consumer goods markets, but also, for example, for financial markets. At the one 
end of the hierarchy, there are a few companies which have a particularly strong reputation 
and dominate the market as leaders and trend setters, and on the other hand there are produc-
ers with no independent brand identity, catering for the needs of low-end and low-price mar-
ket segments. These hierarchies are reflected in many physical characteristics of the business 
process, such as the location of the headquarters, the organization of the distribution process, 
and, of course, the products themselves. There is also a whole gamut of signals that commu-
nicate the hierarchical position, which is observeable, for example, in the distinctive uses of 
advertising. 
Joel Podolny (1993, 2005) has presented a theory of status in market competition which ar-
gues that status cannot be simply explained by standard economic theories, but has to be as-
signed an independent theoretical role. This is tantamount to proposing an institutional theory 
of status, in the sense of emergent informal institutionalization. 
The standard explanation goes back to information economics and signaling theories. Status 
would appear to be a solution to the problem of how to communicate true quality to consum-
ers when facing certain fundamental limits to credible communication. The central argument 
is that a high-quality producer will use signals that are costly to the high quality producer, but 
can only be produced at a higher marginal cost by low-quality producers. This prevents the 
low-quality producer to imitate the high-quality producer, or even to cheat over the quality 
signals. So, the market hierarchy results to be a separating equilibrium with truthful signalling 
of quality. 
However, Podolny argues that these arguments do not suffice to explain the observations. One 
essential part of the phenomenon is lacking. This is that status does not only have effects on 
the distribution of information about a given level of quality, but also changes the level of 
accessible quality. The reason is that all high status producers can access all inputs at a lower 
comparative cost in the sense that they can produce high quality with lower relative costs than 
any other competitor (for example, suppliers are keen to keep the relation with them, and so 
accept lower prices). This results into an objective barrier to entry for non-status producers, 
even if they were also able to produce the high quality good. They cannot do it at the same 
cost. However, the high status producer could produce any level of quality with lower relative 
cost. But this would imply that its own behavior would undermine the perceived status hierar-Institutions, Distributed Cognition and Agency: Rule-following as Performative Action 
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chy. Thus, the high status producer will avoid actions that undermines its position, thus effec-
tively supporting the segmentation of the market. 
Podolny’s theory can be interpreted as providing a specific example for performative actions. 
High status is a performative action because it contributes to the conditions of its own actuali-
zation (which is an example of the so-called Matthew effect). Further, status is a positional 
good, so that signals can only be used by a limited number of users. In this view, the status 
hierarchy on the market is no longer endogenous to market actions, but becomes an exoge-
nous determinant of actions, i.e. is an institution. Status is ‘real’, in the first place, because 
there are real differences in quality, and because the barriers to entry on both the high and the 
low level segment of the market are sustained endogenously by both the properties of the pro-
duction process (high quality can be produced at the lowest relative cost by the high status 
producer) and the status signs (which can only be communicated credibly if the high status 
producer does not exploit its cost advantages in the low status market segment). 
This performative action is also anchored in neuronal patterns which directly undergird the 
hierarchy of status. One of the celebrated results of neuroeconomic applications in marketing 
is the discovery that brands elicit other neuronal responses that non-branded goods of even 
similar quality. The seminal study is McClure et al. (2004) who compared the effects of the 
Coke and Pepsi brands among each other and with non-branded goods. They showed that 
brands activate different parts of the brain than non-branded tastes. In the latter case, the pref-
erences of the test persons were reflected in differential activity in the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex. In the former case, more complex patters emerged which involved the Hippocampus, 
the Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the midbrain. The VMPFC activation reflects the acti-
vation of the standard reward systems in the brain, so sensory inputs (tastes) activate reward 
expectations, especially in the case when test persons are presented with anonymized drinks 
and recognize the taste differences of their preferred drinks. Brand knowledge changed this 
pattern substantially, especially with Coke having a direct effect also on the subjectively ex-
perienced taste differences. Interestingly, this brand effect was only strong for Coke, but not 
for Pepsi. Only Coke elicited a very strong shift of brain activity to the aforementioned areas. 
McClure et al. hypothesize that this results from the activation of specific memories, espe-
cially involving affective bias. 
This result has been confirmed in other studies and reveals a ‘winner takes all’ effect in brand 
loyality (overview in Plassmann et al. 2007, Hubert and Kenning 2008). There is a clear dif-
ference between individually favoured brands and all other brands in terms of brain activity. 
In case of standard brands, the brain activates those parts which are typically related with ra-
tional decision making, reward expectations, and choice. In case of the favoured brand, activi-
ties prevail which are related with emotionally grounded memories. As a hypothesis, one can 
therefore say that favoured brands connect causally with somatic markers in the sense of 
Damasio. 
Therefore, I argue that the status hierarchy in markets is causally connected with distributed 
somatic markers in a population of consumers. The neuroeconomic research explains why the 
status hierarchy is exogenous to the market process, as long as the branded producers orient 
their activities to maintaining the competitve edge. Changes of the status hierarchy are major 
market disruptions. One factor is that they would require substantial changes in the distributed 
pattern of consumer behavior which is rooted in neuronal mechanisms. Institutions, Distributed Cognition and Agency: Rule-following as Performative Action 
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So, we can conceive of brands and the corresponding status hierarchies on markets as out-
comes of performative actions. Performativity results from the fact that the brand order is 
causally connected with two processes that have immediate physical consequences. One is 
that the status hierarchy is anchored in distributed somatic markers on the consumer side, the 
other is the effect on the relative costs of producing a given quality of goods.  
6  Conclusion 
 
In the previous pages I have developd a naturalistic conception of rule following which posits, 
in most general terms, that institutions are rooted in emotional states. This is a perspective 
which stands in flat contradiction with most rational choice approaches to institutions, such as 
contractarianism. Further, I argue that emotions as inner states of neuronal systems are caus-
ally connected with external physical facts, which stand in a sign relation with the neuronal 
system. So, institutions depend essentially on those sign systems. This is the distributed cog-
nition dimension of my approach, which is Hayekian in spirit. 
 
Figure 5: Aoki’s model, naturalized 
 
In figure 5 I relate this position back to Aoki’s model. The fundamental structure is main-
tained, but there are two fundamental changes. The line separating the behavioral and the 
cognitive dimension runs diagonal and therefore connects the individual and the aggregate 
dimension. This is because we now distinguish between performativity in the behavioral di-Institutions, Distributed Cognition and Agency: Rule-following as Performative Action 
20 
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 157 
 
mension and distributed cognition in the aggregate dimension. Performativity refers to the 
action patterns generated on the individual level, and which emerge from the feedback loops 
between individual neuronal states and the population level via the mechanism of imitation. 
Distributed cognition refers to the sign systems, which trigger individual actions, and which 
emerge in a population level dynamics, basically a diffusion dynamics driven by imitation. 
The sign systems attain causal force because they are causally connected with particular neu-
ronal states.  
The entire feedback circle is based on a naturalistic account of causation, which is the second 
difference to the original Aoki model. So, I have minor, but essential changes in wording, 
because I do not use terms which relate with intentionality and mental states, such as ‘incen-
tivizes’. Sign systems trigger the activation of dispositions, and dispositions cause choices, 
with the possibility of random variations and errors. Recursive states of play do not generate 
‘public representations’, as the latter term suggests reference to mental states and represented 
facts, but they result causally into certain signs as physical facts. 
I think that this view on rule following as performative action opens a new way how to inte-
grate neuroeconomics with economics. The exclusive focus of neuroeconomics on choice in 
the microeconomic sense neglects the fact that almost all human behavior is guided by habits, 
norms and institutions. A naturalistic economic theory of human behavior has to take account 
of this fact and pays attention to the resulting complexity of systems which causally connect 
neuronal processes and the external world of other human beings, artefacts and other entities. 
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